

Institution: King's College London		
Unit of Assessment: 28 History		
Title of case study: (Towards) Informed Intelligence: Embedding Knowledge and Building Capacity in UK Intelligence Tradecraft		
Period when the underpinning research was undertaken: 2008–2020		
Details of staff conducting the underpinning research from the submitting unit:		
Name(s):	Role(s) (e.g. job title):	Period(s) employed by submitting HEI:
Michael S. Goodman	Professor of Intelligence and International Affairs	From 01/09/2004
Period when the claimed impact occurred: 2006–2020		
Is this case study continued from a case study submitted in 2014? N		

1. Summary of the impact

The last 15 years have witnessed significant change for the UK intelligence community, following the Butler Report (2004). This blamed flawed intelligence analysis (the critical interpretation of information in order to forecast trends and scenarios) for costly operational failures in the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Goodman's research has had impact relating to key recommendations from the Butler Report and the subsequent Blackett Review (2011). It has demonstrated how academic research knowledge and methods can bring to light new perspectives and challenge analysts' assumptions. In particular, since 2014, impacts based on Goodman's research as the Official Historian at the Cabinet Office, and his subsequent academic-to-government knowledge exchange and outreach efforts, have been conceptual (establishing the relevance and practical utility of historical perspectives), attitudinal (improved dialogue and receptiveness to external expertise), capacity-building (formal training) and operational (recommendations leading to the formation and establishment of a new national Intelligence Assessment Academy). Goodman's research has served to directly inform and alter practice throughout all levels of government and the intelligence community.

2. Underpinning research

Goodman's research – supported through funding by the British Academy, Arts and Humanities Research Council (AHRC), Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) and the Cabinet Office – has established how the history of intelligence can be used to identify lessons of contemporary relevance and, in so doing, inform changes in practice. This includes contributing both historical-biographical knowledge of intelligence developments, successes and failures and the ways in which methods of historical research (data collection, documentary interpretation, source validation and the study of complex interactions and causal relationships) can support the development of analytical tradecraft.

The Official History of the Joint Intelligence Committee

Goodman wrote the first historical account of the way in which intelligence was used to inform foreign and defence policy [1]. Goodman's work followed his appointment as Official Historian by the Prime Minister and his receipt of two Cabinet Office grants for secondments to produce the work. This post afforded him invaluable access to all relevant classified and released materials in the archives of the Cabinet Office, Number 10, Foreign Office, Ministry of Defence and other government departments, to examine records from Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) Assessments and the papers of the JIC Secretariat. Archival work was supplemented by oral history, with interviews with former civil servants, diplomats and military personnel providing first-hand accounts of how the intelligence community and its operations were perceived, interpreted and remembered. Due to the sensitive nature of both the material and personnel, such a study had never previously been achieved. The research was the first historical description of the intelligence machinery of government, the first to demonstrate the tactical role of the JIC in supporting decision-making in operations and the first to look at its management to understand its successes and failures. *Spying on the World*, arising from a British Academy grant, further

described 24 historical case studies showing the evolution of the JIC between 1936 and 2013 [2]. This body of research highlighted the important role of one of the least understood Whitehall committees: one which was subject to considerable scrutiny after the 2004 Butler Report and of immense public interest post-Iraq. *The Official History of the Joint Intelligence Committee* and *Spying on the World* [1,2] were both featured in *The Independent* (11 July 2014) and the former was included in *The Spectator's* Books of the Year list (15 November 2014). The researching of the *Official History* was illustrative of challenges of writing history from classified primary source material, a process reflected upon in the article 'Writing the Official History of the Joint Intelligence Committee' [3] and indicative of another arc of Goodman's research: reflections on the researching and teaching of intelligence studies, to maximise productive engagement with practitioner and policy communities.

Creating a blended approach to studying the history of intelligence

How the trajectory of academic intelligence studies relate to challenges in government intelligence practice: Goodman's research has documented the emergence of intelligence studies as a distinct discipline [4]. This research – taking the form of a review of developments in government intelligence agencies alongside histories of course provision in UK and US higher education institutions – detailed the differing trajectories of intelligence studies on either side of the Atlantic since 1960, providing context for understanding challenges for the profession and the (then rapidly expanding) discipline. Having surveyed the emergence of the field, which had mainly bifurcated into History departments on the one hand and Politics departments on the other, the research advocated for a blended approach to intelligence studies that combined historical-biographical approaches (accounts and memoirs of specific case studies) with more theoretical treatments of the functional, structural and political contexts in which intelligence communities operate. It also advanced academic co-operation with agencies and practitioners to further understand the problems and methods of intelligence work. Based on 'Teaching about intelligence' [4], the Cabinet Office engaged Goodman to devise training for government intelligence staff. 'What analysts need to understand' [5] provided critical reflective research on the initiative, revealing that analysts were generally less knowledgeable than they needed to be about the history of the wider intelligence community outside their own employing agency and many implicitly use an inductivist model of their work. [text removed for publication] [6] took this further by evaluating the potential impact of academic expertise and historical perspectives on government analytical functions (evaluating the effectiveness of AHRC-funded knowledge exchange activities via 19 follow-up interviews with Whitehall officials).

3. References to the research

1. **Goodman, M.** (2014). *The Official History of the Joint Intelligence Committee: Volume I: From the Approach of the Second World War to the Suez Crisis*. London: Routledge. Commissioned by the Cabinet Office for the Government's Official History Series. doi:10.4324/9781315881560.
2. Aldrich, R., Cormac, R. and **Goodman, M.** (2014). *Spying on the World: The Joint Intelligence Committee and Events which Shaped History, 1936–2013*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
3. **Goodman, M.** (2018). Writing the Official History of the Joint Intelligence Committee. *Secrecy and Society*, 2(1), 1–15. <https://scholarworks.sjsu.edu/secrecyandsociety/vol2/iss1/9>.
4. **Goodman, M.** (2006). Teaching about intelligence. *CIA Studies in Intelligence*, 50(2), 57–66. https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol50no2/html_files/Studying_Teaching_6.htm.
5. **Goodman, M.** and Omand, D. (2008). What analysts need to understand: the King's Intelligence Studies Programme. *Studies in Intelligence*, 52(4), 57–65. <https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol-52-no-4/teaching-intelligence-analysts-in-the-uk.html>.
6. Dover, R. and **Goodman, M.** (2018). Impactful scholarship in intelligence: a public policy challenge. *British Politics*, 1–18. doi:10.1057/s41293-018-0078-8.

4. Details of the impact

Impact case study (REF3)

Goodman's research has transformed how academic expertise is engaged with and used by the intelligence community. Previously, closed systems gave little thought to including academic insights in the analytical process. Goodman's research thus fulfils key recommendations of the 2004 Butler Report, noted above, and the subsequent 2011 Blackett Review (of high-impact, low-probability security risks). Specifically, the research has resulted in three main changes to intelligence community practice: analysts have been brought into closer dialogue with academics and become better equipped to interpret the positive and negative lessons from intelligence history; thereby improving the effectiveness of their interpretative and technical skills; and thus increasing the professionalisation of their tradecraft nationally and internationally.

Knowledge exchange and 'lessons learned' for contemporary practice

A series of grants from the AHRC (2011–13 and 2014–16, and a King's College London Higher Education Innovation Fund grant in 2013–14) acted as a key impact pathway by supporting a Lessons Learned seminar series within Whitehall and [text removed for publication that provided a structure for engagement and commissioned research in partnership with the Cabinet Office, Ministry of Defence, Foreign Office and Royal United Services Institute (RUSI). These focused on the historical roots of contemporary security challenges – exploring examples of good and bad analysis in order to identify process lessons, to help policymakers draw on wider research into the historical and cultural elements [1,3] of currently developing foreign policy situations and allow broader discussion of the historical and theoretical frameworks within which solutions are conceived [6]. This was important because layers of secrecy had historically ensured that the intelligence community was insulated from the world of academia and the research resources and findings it offers. According to [text removed for publication] [A]. Such activities described and refined the conditions in which to generate impact with such closed practitioner communities.

Capacity-building for more effective interpretative skills and capability

Goodman's research on analytical challenges in historical perspective and case studies of intelligence analysis [4] was an important step as the Whitehall/academia relationship was still in its infancy, less than a year after the Cabinet Office appointed its first Professional Head of Intelligence Analysis. It led the incumbent, Jane Knight, to ask Goodman to devise new study materials and workshops for their analysts, with the overall aim to enhance analysis capability to enable it to work more effectively. This led to the King's Intelligence Studies Programme, convened with Professor Sir David Omand (Cabinet Office Security & Intelligence Co-ordinator (2002–05), Home Office Permanent Secretary (1997–2000) and GCHQ Director (1996–97)) [5]. The value of the Programme has been demonstrated in having analysts confront and challenge their own assumptions via specialised training in best practice from the academic community, the better to improve their abilities to assess information from familiarity with a broader range of (academic, historic) approaches and methods. More than 1,000 people from across government have completed the Programme and [text removed for publication As [B] asserts: [text removed for publication] [B].

Increasing the professionalisation of intelligence analysis tradecraft, nationally and internationally

Goodman's research has ensured the effective integration of academic expertise into the professionalisation agenda within a previously closed government system. In 2019, as part of a major change programme for the government's intelligence community, its first ever Professional Development Framework was launched, including the need for proficiency in working with academic sources under the 'Analysis, Tradecraft & Assessment' technical skill (as per [4,5,6] and historical briefings (based on [1] and [2]) are now part of analysts' inductions: [text removed for publication] [C].

In 2019, the Cabinet Office moved to create an Intelligence Assessment Academy, after earlier commitments from the National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence & Security Review had stalled [6]. This was a key recommendation from Goodman's review of government-proposed investments and the development of the profession of analysis: a dedicated intelligence analysis academy to further formalise and institutionalise academia-practitioner links and correct the imbalance between increasing intelligence collection capabilities, on the one hand, with limited investment in the size, scope and capability of assessment capabilities, on the other. [text removed for publication] [C].

Such changes in intelligence analytical standards and in academic-practitioner collaboration have been successfully exported internationally. The Norwegian Defence Intelligence School in Oslo (where Goodman has been a Visiting Professor since 2015) introduced professional intelligence education based on his approach in 2014. Goodman's research and approaches to training analysts have been influential across [text removed for publication] [5,D]. Goodman received invitations to the Bundesnachrichtendienst (Germany's Federal Intelligence Agency) in 2015 and a new pan-European professionalisation programme is in development with the European Union Intelligence and Situation Centre, as well as the Polish military intelligence directorate and the Austrian Ministry of the Interior.

Goodman's research has directly informed the understanding of the function of intelligence throughout both the national and international community and has created concrete recommendations that have refined best-practice across all levels of British intelligence.

5. Sources to corroborate the impact

- A. [text removed for publication]
- B. [text removed for publication].
- C. [text removed for publication]
- D. [text removed for publication].